It is the venality at the very top that most offends. Given the lofty levels of compensation that CEOs in the United States typically receive, it is hard for the average person (or more importantly, the average politician) to understand the desire for further aggrandizement and reluctance to accept responsibility for poor performance. One suspects that sense of outrage at the abuse of trust is mirrored, and perhaps magnified, inside the boardrooms of the corporations caught up in the wrongdoing. The directors who have placed their confidence, and to some extent their reputations, in the hands of the CEO (who generall y will also serve as chairman of the board) are likely to feel a sense of betrayal as well as outrage. The outside directors are probably not the last to know, but they may take the most personal offense at the abuse.
How natural, then, is the instinct of policymakers confronted by corporate wrongdoing to want to harness that sense of betrayal and outrage inside the boardroom to make better citizens out of corporations and their officers. If onJy we could shift power from the inside directors to the outside directors, all would be well. The insiders, most offensively the CEO/Chair, may have been complicit in the wrongdoing. But as for the outside directors, generally the worst that can be said is that they did not know of the accounting shenanigans or outsized bet. Perhaps shifting power to the latter, relatively innocent group, · we could thwart the wrongdoing before it even gets started, or at least root it out before it begins to snowball into a major scandal. Conflict of interest is the problem, goes the story, so shifting authority to individuals whose judgment is unclouded by conflict will greatly reduce the embarrassing problems that keep appearing in the headlines. Agency costs will be kept in check by recruiting faithful agents as independent directors to monitor the insiders; politicians and bureaucrats will avoid the awkward questions that inevitably arise out of corporate scandal: "Why didn't you catch this sooner? Why wasn't there a law to prevent this? What are you going to do to help these investors who have lost all this money?"
The American faith in independent directors appears to have attracted adherents globally -the long-term trend has been toward greater director independence around the world. I will focus here, however, on two countries:
Korea and the United States. Both countries have turned to corporate governance reform in the wake of crises. For Korea, the impetus was an economy-wide financial crisis that led to the intervention of the IMF in 1998. Weaknesses of corporate governance were widely perceived as exacerbating the financial shock to the Korean economy.1l In this regard, the recent Korean experience echoed the American experience with the market crash of October 1929, which was popularly blamed for the subsequent widespread economic hardship that accompanied the Great Depression. That episode led to the first federal securities laws in the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Those laws created the essential framework of the securities regime that still governs in the U.S. In adopting those laws, however, the 1930's Congress generally avoided wholesale incursions into the internal governance of corporations, leaving that area generally for the states (with the limited exception of disclosure relating to proxies). For the United States, the impetus to corporate governance reform was the collapse of high-tech bubble, which saw the tech-laden Nasdaq index plunge from nearly 5000 to 2000 in a year's time.2l That collapse was accompanied by a salient scandal which fueled the drive to reform. A series of high-profile accounting imbroglios (e.g., Emon, Worldcom, Healthsouth, etc.), reflected any number of violations of existing disclosure and anti-fraud requirements. As a result, the U.S. has witnessed a number of criminal indictments and convictions for those disclosure violations. Prosecution, however, was not deemed a sufficient response (except perhaps by those indicted), so the accounting scandals have also produced a number of governance reforms which apply to the guilty and innocent alike. None of these reforms seem to have helped with the next crisis, which stemmed from inadequate risk management, perhaps fueled by poorly structured incentive compensation that rewarded executives of financial institutions for placing enormous wagers on the direction of the housing market.
Korea is further along from its motivating financial crisis. It has made great strides during the intervening period in bringing its corporate governance requirements up to international standards. Korea, infected like other 1) Hwa-Jin Kirn, Living with tl ie IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. lNTL L. 61, 69 (1999) .
2) The Nasdaq closed at 5,048. The United States by contrast, already boasted governance standardsarising from a combination of state corporate law, exchange listing standards, and best practices -that were among the most stringent in the world when it faced its spate of the accounting scandals. Nonetheless, those governance controls proved inadequate to prevent the sort of attention-getting frauds that typically lead to corporate and securities fraud reform. The regulatory backlash in the United States has led to the enactment of best practices as a matter of federal law in the hope that doing so will help prevent fraud in the future. Were those toughened standards needed, or were they overkill ? Will the United States' rigorous new standards prevent the fraud next time?
Obviously these two countries' reform drives have significantly raised governance standards in both countries. More interesting, perhaps, is the fact that the gap between the two has narrowed. Korean governance standardsat least on paper -have many similarities to the standards now in place in the United States. This facial similarity between the governance regimes in the two countries overlooks one critical fact -the corporate environment varies dramatically between Korea and the United States. Although the Korean economy continues to be dominated by the chaebol groups of affiliated companies, the American economy is dominated by publicly-held companies with widely dispersed shareholders. One question raised by Korea's move to upgrade to international best practices is whether the practices appropriate for a country like the United States, which has very few controlling shareholders, can be translated into Korea's complex web of corporate groups. What implication does this wide divergence in the two countries' corporate environ ments have for determining the appropriate standards for corporate governance? Most importantly for purpose of looking at the role of outside directors, does independence have the same meaning and purpose in the context of a corporate group? Does the notion of independence need to be adjusted to fit into a group context? Should directors' independence be measured with respect to the group as a whole, or only with respect to the individual affili ated company within the group?
In Parts 1 and 2 of this paper, I discuss the current state of corporate governance in Korea and the United States and the recent changes to the two regimes. In Part 3, I compare the very diff erent governance problems faced in those two countries and analyze whether the independent director is the answer to the problems faced in either country. I conclude that the independent director is unlikely to eliminate fraud and self-dealing from the American capital markets, as it proponents may have hoped. I also conclude, however, that the use of independent directors, if properly bolstered by other governance measures, could help mitigate the problems fostered by the chaebol system in Korea.
Part 1: Corporate Governance in Korea
The Dominance of the Chaebol
The defining characteristic of corporate governance in Korea is the predominance of chaebols, a group of affiliated firms, which although they are legally independent, are nonetheless tied together by cross shareholdings.3l
The group is commonly dominated by a controlling shareholder or family.
Although common shares carry one vote per share in Korea (dual class shares are prohibited for now4l), the strategic use of cross ownership results in the controlling shareholder exercising voting power over the affili ated companies substantially greater than the controller's economic rights. Kim In part to maintain this control, chaebol firms rely heavily on debt.6> Indeed, this is the principal benefit afforded by affiliation with the chaebol group: affiliated firms have greater access to financing than non-chaebol firms, the result of cross-debt guarantees among chaebol member firms.7l Moreover, the importance of the chaebol to the Korean economy means that they were historically "too big to fail," enjoying the implicit guarantee of a bailout from the government.8> That guarantee now appears to have been withdrawn, as evidenced by the demise of the Daewoo group. Perhaps the recently enacted prohibition of loans and guarantees to specially-related persons will put pressure on the chaebol to reduce their debt levels.9> The available evidence suggests that substantial improvement has been made already, with the debt load of the chaebol substantially reduced from where it stood at the time of the IMF crisis.10>
Evidence on the Effect on Minority Shareholders
Unfortunately, the benefits afforded by greater access to debt carries with it substantial costs for equity holders. The "separation of ownership and control" enjoyed by the controlling shareholders of the chaebol has important implications for minority shareholders in Korean firms. Although this separation of cash flow rights from control rights may reduce the cost of debt (perhaps because it aligns the interests of default-averse creditors with the interests of under-diversified controlling shareholders), it may also leave 6) Jae-Seung Baek et al. firm-level performance, whereas it is significantly related for non-chaebol firms.16) In addition, executive compensation correlates with stock-market returns and return on assets for non-chaebol firms, but there is no significant relation between these performance measures and executive compensation for chaebol firms, despite the fact that chaebol firms pay their executives more.17) Not surprisingly, the stock market appears to recognize this risk of abuse by the controlling shareholders of chaebol firms: Baek, Kang & Park find that firms in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights exceed his economic rights had significantly lower returns during Korea's financial crisis.18l By contrast, firms with the largest non-managerial blockholder concentration experience significantly greater stock returns during the crisis.19) These findings suggest that concentrated ownership is not the problem; it is the separation of control from cash flow entitlements. In addition, transparency helps mitigate the problem; firms with cross-listed ADRs (thereby subject to more stringent disclosure regimes) and firms with substantial foreign institutional investment also enjoyed significantly less negative returns. 2 0l Monitoring of management by large investors -without the risk of expropriation by the controlling shareholder -benefits all of the investors.
Reforming the Chaebols
Reforming the corporate governance of the chaebols to discourage misappropriation from minority shareholders has been a principal focus of the government since the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Large firms (i.e., those with assets greater than 2 trilli on won) are singled out for especially stringent corporate governance requirements. Large firms must draw at least half of their directors from outside the firm, have an audit committee with at least two-thirds outside directors, and have a nominating committee for outside directors.26) Chaebol firms have also received special attention. Principal shareholders who act as de facto directors or otherwise influence company management now owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation, whether or not they serve formally as directors.27) Moreover, conflict of interest transactions involving the firms in the groups with more than 5 trilli on of total assets must be approved by the board of directors.28l There is evidence that a similar provision adopted by the SK Group in its articles of incorporation has been effective in preventing at least some overreaching by the controlling shareholder.29) It is worth noting that the provision in question may have been adopted as a result of pressure from foreign investors. To summ arize, the main challenge facing the Korean system of corporate governance is the predominance of the chaebol system. Korea has made great strides over the last few years to try and bolster the protections afforded to minority shareholders, but more must be done. I will tum to that topic in Part 3. In this system of dispersed public ownership, the principal concern for abuse of power by those in control is. not the risk posed by controlling shareholders, but rather, the potential for overreaching by managers. Given the dispersion of ownership, the voting mechanism will only be a weak check on managerial abuse and incompetence. Managers (particularly CEOs) in practice have a great deal of say over who will be named to the company's board, so the ability of the shareholders to affect the company's direction through their power to elect directors will be diffuse at best. Recognizing these weaknesses in direct accountability to widely dispersed shareholders, the corporate governance regime in the United States aims to protect the interests of largely powerless shareholders from overreaching by managers.
Controlling shareholders are a concern, but a secondary one. The principal role of independent directors in the corporate regime of the United States is to restrain the CEO and other managers.
Evidence on the Effect of Independent Directors
What does the available evidence from the United States show about the success of independent directors in restraining managers? Most notably, on the subject presumably of greatest interest to shareholders, there is no evidence to show that more independent boards correlate with better firm performance.34) So shareholders cannot rely on independent directors to bolster the bottom line. This should hardly be surprising -if outside directors were a magic elixir, somehow boosting corporate performance, we would hardly need governance mandates to encourage greater board independence.
Companies would bring more independent directors on board purely out of self-interest. These studies, however, rely on data that may have little bearing on current practice because governance practices in the United States have considerably less variation today than they did ten to twenty years ago. Virtually all of the boards of American public companies are now "above average," at least when compared with the governance practices of a generation ago.
Reforming the Role of Independent Directors
The corporate governance reforms in the United States have not been directed toward areas in which independent directors have been shown to have a positive influence on shareholder returns. Instead, the reforms are pinned to the hope that independent directors can encourage more accurate financial reporting. That focus reflects the scandals that give rise to the impetus for reform. The reforms came in response to a series of accounting scandals at large public companies, most notably Enron, Worldcom, Adelphia and Tyco. Unlike Korean crisis of 1997-1998, the stock market decline that accompanied these headlines of scandal did not have any appreciable effect on the overall economy. Notwithstanding the limited economic impact of these scandals, the widespread wrongdoing at those prominent firms raised concerns that it might reflect a broader pattern of misleading financial statements and self-dealing. Among the concerns raised were: (1) the perception that managers focused too narrowly on showing earnings growth from quarter to quarter, which may have created a temptation to shade the numbers in order to show that growth; (2) the closely-related concern that incentive-based compensation, which was supposed to align managers' interests with those of shareholders, again may have tempted managers to play fast-and-loose with accounting-based measures of performance; and (3) a limited form of self-dealing involving not related-party transactions of the sort seen in the chaebol, but instead enormous pay packages to managers, seemingly unchecked by too quiescent independent directors. was the political response to the accounting crisis in the United States.42> Not surprisingly, given that the impetus for legislation arose out of accounting problems, the governance reforms adopted in response to the accounting scandals revolve around the relation of public companies to their external auditors. Those external auditors were perceived to be lacking in the independence. A variety of restrictions were adopted to foster auditor independence; the reform involving the board was to make the external auditors solely accountable to independent directors. Although anxious to be seen "doing something" about corporate misbehavior, Congress took pains to avoid responsibility for the details of the reforms to be adopted. Instead of requiring that audit committees be made up solely of independent directors, Congress instead directed national securities exchanges to adopt listing standards requiring wholly-independent audit committees.43> The distinction between laws and listing standards is largely cosmetic, given that changes in listing standards are subject to approval by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In effect, the delegation of this task to the exchanges was a de facto takeover of an important aspect of corporate governance from state corporate law (its traditional domain in the American system). The takeover was done, however, with a self-regulatory veneer, useful because the exchanges have imposed governance standards, of varying degrees of intrusiveness, for decades.44> Those listing standards now require not only that all members of the audit committee be independent (as directed by Congress), but also require that those members be "financially literate" or possess "financial sophistication."45> Sarbanes-Oxley also requires that the independent audit committee have exclusive authority over the retention and compensation of auditors.46> Auditors also must report to the audit committee material accounting decisions.47> Finally, the law establishes "whistle- 46) Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 301, supra note 43.
blowing" procedures for employees to report concerns about accounting to the audit committee. 48l
The requirement of the independent audit committee supplements the requirement that the board of directors have a majority of independent directors. Both the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq listing standards now mandate that independent directors predominate. 
54) Press

The Path Forward fo r Independent Directors in Korea
Korea's public companies continue to be dominated by the chaebol; that dominance is unlikely to end any time soon. As a result, the chaebol are the face of Korean companies for many potential investors. As the research discussed in Part 1 demonstrates minority shareholders in those firms face very substantial risks of expropriation by the controlling shareholder. They face an even more substantial risk that the chaebol group will be managed to minimize the losses to the controlling shareholder. Potential investors have good grounds to be wary of placing their money in the hands of the controlling shareholders.
The combination of chaebol dominance and controlling shareholder abuses means that the chaebol present a difficult 11 chicken-and-egg" problem for Korean reformers. On the one hand, the available evidence suggests that the shareholders of the chaebol companies would benefit the most from improvements in corporate governance. Korea cannot encourage a culture of investor confidence in Korean companies (with the attendant benefits that this would create for economic growth) without taming the power of the controlling shareholders of the chaebol and protecting minority shareholders from their overreaching. Chaebol shareholders, as a group, would be better off if governance were improved, but the benefits would accrue primarily to minority shareholders at the expense of controlling shareholders. Thus, controlling shareholders, anxious to preserve their substantial discretion, are likely to pose a substantial obstacle to further reform. As a result of their wealth and central role of their businesses in the Korean economy, the controlling shareholders exercise tremendous influence in policy discussions.
Slicing this Gordian knot to promote a system that facilitates the confidence of minority investors is the central challenge facing Korean regulators today.
Can the knot be cut? Unfortunately, the answer to this critical question is:
"Not overnight." Moreover, the task will take considerable political will . The hope is that independent directors may be the 11 camel's nose under the tent" that eventually brings true transparency and accountability in Korea's corporate boardrooms. The power of independent directors will need to be bolstered, however, to achieve this end. But any increase in the power of independent directors is likely to draw opposition from the controlling shareholders of the chaebol. To overcome that opposition, Korean reformers must strategically take advantage of the periodic opportunities for reformcreated by financial crisis and scandal -to press for further power in the hands of boards dominated by independent directors. Every incident in which a controlling shareholder is publicly disgraced is an opportunity for further reform.
The governance reforms already adopted in Korea are critical first steps. Much reliance is placed, however, on independent directors to ensure that these reforms translate into actual protection for minority shareholders. To achieve this goal, independent directors need to be independent in more than just name. At a minimum, independent directors need to be independent of other members of the chaebol group, in addition to independent of the company on whose board they serve. The current rule is that independent directors cannot be employees of affiliated companies of the chaebol group.71l They are not barred, however, from service as directors for chaebol affili ates.72l Service as a director might not be thought to be sufficient to compromise independence. The fees paid to directors are, after all, relatively modest when compared to the typical directors' wealth and income. So one might perhaps conclude that service as a director of an affiliated company should not be deemed to compromise independence. On the other hand, directors owe a duty to each of the companies on whose boards they serve, and in the chaebol, these duties are likely to come into conflict.
The problem, however, may go deeper than a conflict of interest or legal duty, either perceived or real. What is needed is a counter to controlling shareholders' manipulation of transactions among the chaebol affiliated companies. From this perspective, an independent director loyal to the group, rather than the individual company, is not likely to help. The independent director must be independent from the group in order to be fully independent 71) KOREAN COMMEROAL CODE, art. 382.
72) Id.
from the controlling shareholder. To be sure, this will impose costs on group cohesiveness, but that is the point. If the controlling shareholder wants a free hand to transfer assets among affili ated companies, the companies should be merged, or the minority shareholders should be bought out and the structure changed to a parent/ subsidiary one with 100% ownership. Requiring independent directors for all members of the group imposes a tax on an interlocking corporate structure that has been shown to harm minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders can avoid this tax by moving to a holding company structure, which would carry with it substantially improved transparency. 73) Finding enough independent directors for all group companies will not be easy. A more daunting challenge for reformers, however, is cultural rather than legal. It will take time for Korea to develop a culture of independence necessary for outside directors to have the desired effect on management. The institution of independent directors is starting from a very low level:
Korea has no tradition of active discussion within the Board of Directors, and experience with independent directors has been limited. Korea has far to go before this will be a concern.
These costs might be worth paying in the United States if enhanced independence was likely to substantially reduce the incidence of fraud and self-dealing, as it may do in Korea. But the United States is starting from a much lower incidence of fraud and self-dealing than Korea (and most other countries in which controlling shareholders dominate public companies).
Dispersed share ownership -and the corporate disclosure that promotes such ownership -is the norm in the United States. There is a culture of accountability by corporate managers to the market, as well as the board, that serves as the background for policy efforts to discourage fraud and self dealing. Fraud and greed will always be with us; closing off one avenue simply pushes the fraudsters and the greedy to find another weakness in the system. The quest for regulatory perfection is illusory, but the costs of that quest -which ultimately will be paid by the shareholders who are supposed to benefit from regulation -will be all too real.
Part 4: Conclusion
My focus in this paper has been on the convergence between Korea and the United States on the role of independent directors in corporate governance. Korea has come a long way toward the United States model in the last few years as it responded to a devastating financial crisis, even as the United States raised the bar still higher in response to a corporate crisis of its own. For this effort, Korean reformers are to be congratulated.
Unfortunately, there is still work to be done in Korea. The self-dealing and lack of transparency of the chaebol are the principal impediments to a culture of investor confidence in Korea. Independent directors -preferably selected by institutional investors -can play an important role in making the changes that are needed. To do so, however, their independence must be further strengthened.
The United States, by contrast, now risks overdosing on independence.
Independence facilitates monitoring, but it discourages the trust and candor that are essential to building an effective team. Independence, therefore, should be deployed with caution, and not as the cure-all for the latest scandal to catch the attention of politicians. Time will tell whether the United States has used the appropriate caution in adopting its latest governance reforms. 
